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REPORT 
Number 24-June 1978 
The Coal Tax Challenge 
by 
James J. Lopach* 
The State of Montana is facing a challenge to its coal 
severance tax. Four coal mining companies doing business 
in the state have paid their first quarter 1978 tax under 
protest, alleging for various reasons that the tax is in 
violation of the United States Constitution and law. The 
controversy threatens to result in a court action and 
potential invalidation of the highest coal tax in the nation. 
At stake for Montana is a major revenue source and a 
handful of innovative programs dependent for their funding 
upon the tax. 
The present and projected levels of coal production in the 
state make the coal tax issue one of major significance. In 
1969 a little over one million tons of coal were mined in 
Montana, and the amount increased to over 26 million tons 
in 1976. The Montana Energy Research and Conserv-ation 
Office predicts that in excess of 96 million tons will be mined 
in 1990. Severance tax collections have been equally 
impressive. The state tax collector counted $23 million and 
$34 million in fiscal years 1976 and 1977 respectively. The 
projections for the next two fiscal years are $47 million and 
$56 million. All of this wealth was anticipated by the 
Montana legislators who enacted the severance tax. 
Legislative Intent 
The conference committee that forged the compromise 
settlement in the 1975 legislature viewed its product more as 
a revenue than a regulatory measure. The bill routinely was 
referred to as the major producer of new revenue to be 
introduced during the session. The coal revenue ensured a 
balanced general fund budget for the biennium, and in fact, 
it helped to generate a budgetary surplus. The conference 
committee defended its proposal by saying it was motivated 
by the state's financial needs and not by other states' designs 
for coal development in Montana. 
The probable impact of the severance tax on other states 
and their citizens did not escape Montana legislators. 
Arguments were heard that the tax would cause economic 
retaliation and hostility between Montana and coal 
consuming states. Legislators, however, had firsthand 
knowledge of captive consumption and chose to imitate 
Alberta's pricing policy for natural gas. The conference 
report noted that Alberta had invested its royalty payments 
in universities, hospitals, and tax reductions and concluded 
that "the consumers of Alberta gas in Montana and 
elsewhere have no choice but to finance this program." This 
result to the north was far more desirable than Wyoming's 
seven percent tax on the mine price of coal and disorderly 
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coal development. The Montana Legislature, consequently, 
decided to saddle both in-state and out-of-state coal users 
with the costs of alleviating the impact of coal development 
and increasing the flow of revenue to the state's general fund. 
The 1975 severance tax as enacted provided that surface-
mined coal with a heating quality of under 7,000 Btu per 
pound would be taxed at 20 percent of its contract sales 
price. A tax of 30 percent of value would be imposed on 
stripped coal in excess of7 ,000 Btu. The act repealed the coal 
mines license taxes and deleted coal from the provisions 
taxing the net proceeds of mines. One stated purpose of the 
legislation accordingly was "to simplify the structure of coal 
taxation in Montana, reducing tax overlap and improving 
the predictability of tax projections." The act also provided 
that counties were to levy a tax on the gross proceeds from 
coal just as on other forms of property, and it left intact the 
1973 Resource Indemnity Trust Act which placed a tax of 
one-half of one percent on the gross value of non-renewable 
natural resources, including coal, at the time of their being 
mined. Income from the trust account was intended "to 
improve the total environment and rectify damage thereto." 
Under this act the people of Montana were to be indemnified 
for the extraction of non-renewable natural resources. 
The distribution formula for the revenue gained under the 
coal severance tax was the subject of considerable debate 
during the 1975 legislative session. Since that time the 
formula has been altered by both subsequent legislation and 
a constitutional amendment. Currently 25 percent of the 
coal tax revenue goes to the trust fund created by Article IX, 
Section 5 of the Montana Constitution, whose income can 
be spent by a majority vote of the legislature but whose 
principal is inviolable lacking a three-fourths vote of both 
houses. The remaining 75 percent of the total collections is 
allocated in the following proportions: two percent to the 
county in which the coal is mined to be spent at the discretion 
of the governing body; two and one-half percent for 
alternative energy research development and 
demonstration; 26 and one-half percent for a local impact 
and education trust account which is allocated by the 
Montana Coal Board through a grant program; 13 percent 
for coal area highway improvement; ten percent for state 
equalization aid for public schools; one percent for county 
land planning; two and one-half percent for a loan program 
to develop renewable resources such as water; two and one-
half percent for acquisition and management of parks and 
cultural and aesthetic projects; and the balance to the state 
general fund., 
Local Impact Grants 
The Coal Board's program oflocal impact grants has been 
supervised by the legislature as to the efficacy of spent coal 
tax dollars. Through a system of proposals and awards, coal 
tax revenue was to help remedy the havoc caused by coal 
mining. The Coal Board was authorized by the 1975 
severance tax bill to "assist local governmental units in 
meeting the local impact of coal development by enabling 
them to adequately provide governmental services and 
facilities which are needed as a direct consequence of coal 
development." The legislature further provided that the Coal 
Board should take the following standards into 
consideration in making grants: I) need, 2) severity of impact 
from coal development, 3) degree of local effort in meeting 
needs, and 4) availability of funds. The Coal Board 
subsequently formulated rules to sharpen the legislature's 
criteria. "Need" was interpreted to be "a direct and obvious 
threat to the public health, safety or welfare that has been 
caused as a direct result of coal development." "Severity of 
impact" was characterized as "rapidity of growth and 
subsequent expansion of the problem and the number of 
people affected." "Local effort" was defined in terms of 
"bonding and millage efforts." 
The Coal Board has not been hesitant in funding 
proposals to spend coal severance tax revenue. As of 
December, 1977, the board had awarded grants totalling 
$14,766,063 and denied or tabled requests for $8,286,919. 
The propriety of these awards has concerned the legislature, 
and studies by two agencies inquired into the Coal Board's 
meeting of legislative intent. 
A report by the Office of the Legislative Fiscal Analyst 
(Robert J. Robinson, "Coal Impact and Coal Board 
Grants," September 20, 1977) found that some Coal Board 
grants were more akin to tax relief than essential impact aid 
although this finding is qualified by the kind of local 
government unit receiving the award. Coal area counties and 
school districts, unlike incorporated towns, have 
experienced substantially increased taxable valuations 
"because of the existence of new generating facilities and 
mining equipment and the inclusion of the gross proceeds of 
coal sales on the property tax rolls." Rosebud and Big Horn 
counties, .the areas certified by the Department of State 
Lands as having the most significant coal development, were 
discovered to have low mill levies when compared to 
counties of similar geographic and population size, and thus 
they possessed "substantial unused fiscal capacity to meet 
public needs occasioned by coal development." The taxable 
valuations of incorporated towns, on the other hand, had 
not increased parallel with coal development, and towns 
pushed their mill levy to the legal maximum in order to deal 
with large population growth. With one exception the report 
found Coal Board grants to school districts unwarranted on 
two grounds: either increased enrollments had not been 
experienced or increased tax valuations were more than 
sufficient to support rising enrollments. The conclusion of 
the analysis represents a partial assessment of the Coal 
Board's realization of the legislature's objectives: 
Our review of counties, incorporated towns and school districts in 
the areas certified as impacted by coal development shows that, with 
few exceptions, the impacted units have the means to finance the 
required expenses without state support. The coal area is characterized 
by some of the lowest mill levies in the state and has been blessed by 
mushrooming property valuations. 
This analysis would indicate that the need for state supported local 
impact grants may be much less than originally anticipated by the 
legislature. 
A later study by the Montana Legislative Council (Teresa 
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Olcott Cohea, "Coal Board Grants," January 11, 1978) also 
vindicated the exercise of legislative oversight. The 
researcher found that coal communities had by then taken 
care of their "most pressing needs," such as school 
expansion, water and sewage system improvement, and road 
and fire fighting equipment. The time had come to question 
whether coal communities were unjustifiably receiving 
preferential treatment. Specifically, the Coal Tax Oversight 
Committee was asked to consider: 
1) whether the percentage of coal tax revenue flowing to the coal 
impact fund is appropriate; 2) whether a loan system rather than grants 
would be more equitable in areas where taxable valuation will increase; 
3) whether the current statutory criteria for making grants are 
adequate; and 4) to what level of services and facilities should coal 
impact grants bring a coal-impacted community? 
It is one thing for the legislature to say that programs for 
the use of the coal severance tax should be changed and an 
entirely different matter for a court to conclude that the tax 
is in violation of the United States Constitution and law. The 
record of the local impact grant program could be 
mentioned in a legal attack on the severance tax. One of the 
grounds for the protest of the Decker Coal Co., 
Westmoreland Resources Inc., Western Energy Co., and 
Peabody Coal Co. is that the severance tax bears no 
reasonable relationship to the benefits derived from the 
State of Montana by the taxpayers. If the severance tax-
based local impact grants are superfluous, however, that 
program under the tax should be termed excessive by the 
legislature. A judicial decision on the constitutionality and 
legality of the severance tax would not be grounded in one 
use of the tax but would be made in the context of several 
applicable legal doctrines that have evolved through the 
years. Predicting the fate of the challenge to the Montana 
coal tax must rest on an appreciation of these principles and 
precedents. 
Legal Challenge 
The four protesting coal producers rested their challenge 
on grounds in addition to an imbalance between burden and 
benefits. Arguments raised at the time of the protested tax 
payments included discrimination by Montana against non-
residents engaged in interstate commerce, violation of the 
rights of equal protection and due process guranteed by the 
Fourteenth Amendment of the United States Constitution, 
and frustration and impairment of federal laws and policies. 
The assertion that Montana is unduly restraining interstate 
commerce is part of the argument that the costs of the tax 
outweigh the services the state provides. 
If the protested tax payments eventually result in a court 
action, which is apparently the intent of the coal companies, 
one of the challengers' arguments seemingly would warrant 
early dismissal. This is the equal protection claim that the 
Montana tax discriminates between Montana and out-of-
state producers and consumers. Discrimination is a question 
of the acceptability of a statutory classification, and the 
standard used by courts in economic matters since 1937 is 
whether the legislature had a "reasonable" or "rational" 
basis for establishing separate categories. The Montana law 
makes no distinctions but states, "A severance tax is imposed 
on each ton of coal produced in the state . . .. " Courts 
historically have been very watchful for discrimination 
against interstate commerce in favor of home-state interests. 
The intent of the founding fathers in placing the Interstate 
Commerce Clause in the United States Constitution was 
exactly to prevent commercial barriers from being raised 
between the states. But this motive or result is entirely absent 
from the Montana coal severance tax. 
A reviewing court has available to it another rationale 
with which it could resolve the tax challenge. Coal 
companies are alleging that the Montana tax places an 
undue burden on the flow of interstate commerce and that 
the state policy interferes with established federal policies 
concerning coal mining that have been passed pursuant to 
Congress' power "To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes." A critical issue is what constitutes interstate 
commerce, for the state is free to tax goods and activities. 
within its own jurisdiction. Years ago the United States 
Supreme Court ruled: 
... goods do not cease to be part of the general mass of property in the 
State, subject, as such, to its jurisdiction, and to taxation in the usual 
way, until they have been shipped, or entered with a common carrier 
for transportation to another State, or have started upon such 
transportation in a continuous route or journey [Coe v. Town of Errol, 
116 U.S. 517, 527-28 (1886)]. 
The court in its opinion also made some comments that were 
extraneous to its decision but highly relevant to Montana's 
current situation. Concern was expressed that an opposite 
holding seriously would weaken the fiscal condition of 
western states. If the intent to ship out of state would free 
goods from a state tax, then the tax base of a basically 
exporting state thereby would be eroded. 
Two subsequent cases add special weight to the Coe v. 
Errol rule. In 1922 the Supreme Court upheld a state ad 
valorem tax on coal mined in the state even though there 
were fixed plans for shipping the coal out of the state. The 
court said that the tax in fact was not on goods that had 
entered the stream of commerce [Heislerv. Thomas Colliery 
Co., 260 U.S. 245 (1922)]. Fifty years later, the Supreme 
Court reiterated its longstanding rule and said articles 
cannot claim immunity from a state tax until they actually 
begin "physical entry into the stream of exportation. We find 
no reason to depart from that settled doctrine" [Kosydar v. 
National Cash Register Co., 417 U.S. 62, 71 (1974)]. 
If the court reviewing the severance tax were to determine 
that coal should be treated as interstate commerce, several 
avenues of analysis would be available. The tax could be 
interpreted as being primarily a regulation rather than a 
revenue measure. Viewing the tax in this manner, the court 
would evaluate the impact of the tax on interstate commerce 
by means of a balancing test. The tax, treated as a regulation, 
would be upheld if the state's interest in enforcing the 
measure outweighed the burden it imposed on interstate 
commerce. Several considerations would be central in the 
court's balancing of competing interests. The tax would have 
a greater chance of being upheld if it regulated local as 
opposed to national concerns, aimed at protecting the state's 
general welfare rather than its business concerns, and had 
not overlooked other regulatory alternatives that were less 
burdensome for interstate commerce. Such an approach by 
the court is unlikely, however, as the intent of the Montana 
Legislature clearly was to enact a major revenue measure. 
It is thus more probable that a court would assess the 
impact on interstate commerce as being occasioned by a 
bona fide tax. In a very recent case the United States 
Supreme Court indicated the proper test to apply in such a 
situation. Prior decisions, the court said, 
... have considered not the formal language of the tax statute, but 
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rather its practical effect, and have sustained a tax agains_t ~om~erce 
Clause challenge when the tax is applied to an act1v1ty with a 
substantial nexus with the taxing state, is fairly apportioned, does not 
discriminate against interstate commerce, and is fairly related to the 
services provided by the State" [Complete Auto Transit. Inc. \'. Bradr, 
51 L Ed 2d 326, 331 (1977)]. 
The reasoning of the court is related to the due process and 
burden-versus-benefit challenges raised by the coal 
companies concerning the Montana coal tax. Due process, 
adequacy of benefits, and fair apportionment are all 
essentially a matter of connection or nexus between the 
taxing state and the taxed activities. 
The attention of a court in scrutinizing the effect of a state 
tax on interstate commerce is fastened on the degree of 
connection between the taxingjurisdiction and the interstate 
activities taking place within the ·taxing state. For several 
reasons due process will not admit of a state taxing interstate 
operations that are not related to its jurisdiction. From a 
procedural perspective the court will question a serious 
abuse of taxation without representation; the substantive 
issue is whether the taxing jurisdiction and taxpayer are 
sufficiently connected so that the taxpayer can be construed 
as a recipient of the taxing state's services. Legitimate 
compensation for benefits receiv ed is not nullified, however, 
if the tax proceeds find their way into the state general fund 
instead of being applied to services directly related to the 
taxed activities [Aero Mayflower Transit Co. v. Board of 
Railroad Commissioners, 322 U.S. 495 (1947)]. The United 
States Supreme Court also has held that the benefit or nexus 
required by due process is satisfied by the taxing state 
providing the interstate concern the "substantial privilege of 
carrying on business" in the state [Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney 
Co. 311 U.S. 435, 445 (1940)]. 
The concern of the court in the Complete Auto Transit 
case with fair tax apportionment should have no bearing on 
the Montana law. The prohibition under the Commerce 
Clause relates to a series of states placing the same kind of 
tax on interstate commerce. Such cumulative taxation is 
clearly an undue burden on interstate commerce, but a state 
tax reasonably tied to uniquely local aspects of interstate 
commerce avoids this defect. Because the Montana tax rests 
on the act of extracting coal which necessarily can occur in 
only one state, fair apportionment is not a valid ground upon 
which to challenge the tax. Substantial connection between 
Montana and severance of coal thus would seem to save the 
coal tax from invalidation under the commerce and due 
process clauses. 
The final basis of the anticipated coal company challenge 
is the doctrine of federal preemption, i.e., the Montana tax is 
in conflict with some explicit federal law or policy and thus 
must give way. Such a conclusion must be derived from 
careful interpretation of the federal statute in each specific 
situation, and Congress is assumed to have full power to 
preclude the states from regulating any aspect of interstate 
commerce. Where Congressional intent to occupy a field is 
clear or where state regulation actually conflicts with 
operation of a federal program, a court's finding of federal 
preemption is warranted. The underlying rationale is that 
the states cannot be allowed to frustrate duly authorized 
federal regulation regardless of the federal program's 
longevity or stage of implementation. The mere existence of 
some federal activity, however, does not indicate an 
intention to preempt, and state and federal regulation can 
exist side-by-side, especially if the state is concerning itself 
with essentially local matters. The United States Supreme 
Court has said that it will not lightly presume federal 
preemption when Congress enters "a field which the States 
have traditionally occupied" [Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator 
Corp., 331 U.S. 218, 230 (1947)]. To find Congressional 
preemption of a state revenue program such as the ~o~tana 
coal tax would take discovery of some uncharactenstlcally 
pointed ,statutory language restricting a revenue source to 
federal use only. 
A different kind of preemption rests with the judicial 
branch as opposed to Congress, and here most probably is 
the greatest threat to the Montana coal tax. Courts can 
invoke the "dormant" commerce power to ban state 
regulation of interstate commerce because of conflict with 
what Congress could but did not do. The classic formulation 
of this doctrine is found in Southern Pacific Co. v. Arizona, 
325 U.S. 761 (1945), where the Supreme Court said that the 
judge's role is to weigh the benefits of local control against an 
independent judicial interpretation of competing national 
interests, given Congress' silence on the subject. Under the 
"dormant" congressional power doctrine the court is the 
arbiter of the scope of the federal commerce power and 
decides if a state regulation constitutes an unjustifiable 
burden on interstate commerce. 
Courts have used the dormant commerce power doctrine 
to invalidate state regulation of activities that unmistakably 
are aspects of interstate commerce. A serious challenge to 
the Montana coal tax would arise if a court were to apply the 
doctrine not to state regulation of interstate commerce but to 
a state tax on an intrastate activity that is closely related to 
interstate commerce- mining. The United States Supreme 
Court has frequently upheld Congressional extension of its 
regulatory power under the Commerce Clause to purely 
intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on 
interstate commerce [Shreveport Rate Case, 234 U.S. 342 
(1914); N.L.R.B. v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. , 301 
U.S. I (1937)]. The Supreme Court has not, however, 
independently used the dormant commerce power doctrine 
to nullify state regulation of intrastate activities because of 
what Congress at some future time might do if it extended its 
commerce power to its broadest and most imaginative reach. 
It seems highly unlikely that a court would take such an 
independent leap into the policy arena, as the Supreme 
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Court has required a clear Congressional stat~ment .of 
purpose before upholding Congress' own extens10n of its 
commerce power to activities traditionally regulated at the 
state level [U.S. v. Enmons, 410 U.S. 396 (1973)]. 
Conclusion 
The challenge to the Montana coal tax rests on 
questionable grounds. Because miriing is peculi.arly a local 
activity, the coal tax is within the state's authonty to en~ct, 
precludes cumulative taxation~ an? i~ a norma.l cos! of doing 
business. The tax does not d1scnminate against interstate 
commerce as it applies to production for in-state and out-of-
state consumption alike. Congress has not reserved coal to 
itself as a source of income, and no existing federal law 
preempts such a legitimate state revenue plan. Only if the 
courts were to find a hidden intent in the Commerce Clause 
of the national constitution to ban a state levy on a local 
activity should the Montana tax fall. B~t Congress' long a.nd 
difficult struggle to formulate a nat10nal energy pohcy 
makes the courts' assumption of this role completely 
unjustifiable. · . 
Unlike many states, Montana cannot rely on extensive 
industrial properties, expanding personal incomes, or 
voluminous commercial transactions as reliable sources for 
financing the ever increasing cost of government. Much of 
Montana's wealth is in its natural resources that throughout 
the state's history have been exported for processing and use 
elsewhere. As a result, the state's economy radically has been 
tied to forces and decisions beyond its control. The Montana 
coal tax is a levy on the severance of a major state resource. It 
is a rational attempt to level out the complex, and largely 
unforeseeable, costs of coal development. 
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